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1. For over 20 years, Mary was an employee of XYZ in ,' a Virginia f 
corporation doing business only in Roanoke, Virginia. She served e mpaey-_ . .: 
without interruption, except for a 6-month absence in 1983 after fire-related 
injuries left her severely disfigured but fully capable of performing her 
traditional duties at XYZ. 
Early in 1986, ownership of XYZ changed hands. Thereafter Mary, 52 
years old, s~nsed a hostility toward her from the new management. In July she 
was told that her services were no longer required and her employment was 
terminated effective August 1, 1986. After brooding for a short period, she 
consulted an attorney, and in due course a suit was timely filed in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virgin1a seeking 
reinstatement and back pay, and alleging violations of: 
(a) the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act which prohibits 
discharge of an individual because of the individual's age, and 
(b) the Virginians with Disabilities Act, a state law which prohibits 
employment discrimination against an otherwise qualified person solely,because 
of that person's disability. 
During trial, witnesses testified that Mary was replaced by a 48 year 
old woman and that the new owners had hired a number of new middle managers, 
most of whom are in their 50's and 60's. Substantial testimony was also taken 
on the effect of Mary's disfigurement. Following completion of Mary's 
evidence and upon motion by XYZ's attorney, the judge granted defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the federal Age Discrimination 
complaint against the company. At that point, XYZ's attorney moved to dismiss 
the Disabilities Act claim on the grounds that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
Must the court grant the defendant's motion? 
* * * * * 
2. Furillo was charged with felony homicide as a result of his beating 
to death a pizza delivery man in Vinton, Virginia. Furillo was promptly 
arrested and brought before the judge to be arraigned. His court appointed 
attorney, Davenport, was present with Furillo at his arraignment. 
After the arraignment, Furillo was put in jail to await trial. While 
still in jail, his attorney, Davenport, presented and argued a motion for 
continuance on Furillo's behalf. Davenport told the trial judge, Judge Buntz, 
that because of her heavy trial schedule and the difficulty she had 
experienced in conferring with her client, it would be more convenient for her 
to try Furillo's case at a later time. Judge Buntz denied the motion, and the 
trial was held as scheduled. 
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Furillo an
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d Davenport were both present in court at the time of trial. 
After the evidence had been taken, counsel had completed arguments and the 
jury had been instructed, Furillo was returned to jail. 
After some deliberation, the jury was summoned to the courtroom by 
Judge Buntz who directe.d the following communication to the jury: 
"It looks as if your deliberations might go over until tomorrow. Since 
you should not discuss this case with anyone, if any of you want 
pajamas, night clothes or anything like that, you should get the 
sergeant to phone for you, but you should not phone for yourselves." 
Judge Buntz then advised the clerk of court that his comment should not 
be made part of the record. Both Davenport and Sidney, the Commonwealth's 
Attorney, were present at the time of this comment, although Furillo remained 
in jail. 
About an hour later, the jury sent a message to the judge asking 
whether it could hear additional testimony from one of the Commonwealth's 
witnesses. Judge Buntz advised both Sidney and Davenport of this request and, 
after discussing the matter with both counsel, sent a written message to the 
jury which read as follows: "You must base your verdict on the evidence and 
instructions before you. 11 
The jury resumed its deliberations and later returned a verdict of 
guilty against Furillo. 
After his conviction, Furillo retained another attorney, Daniels, to 
appeal his case. Daniels conducted an investigation and raised three points 
for his appeal. Daniels claimed on appeal that: 
(a) It was reversible error for Judge Buntz to hear Davenport's motion 
for a continuance without Furillo being present in court. 
(b) It was reversible error for Judge Buntz, without Furillo being 
present in court, to advise the jury members that they might have the sergeant 
phone for bedclothes. 
(c) It was reversible error for Judge Buntz, without Furillo being 
personally present in court, to communicate with the jury relative to its 
instructions. 
How should the Court of Appeals rule on each point raised by Daniels? 
* * * * * 
3. You have represented Jane Jones in filing a motion for judgment in 
the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia, against Sue Smith to recover 
damages for personal injuries that Jones sustained in an automobile accident. 
Smith admitted 1 i ability and the action went to trial by jury on the issue of 
damages only. 
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Jones introduced evidence at trial of accident related injuries 
consisting of a broken arm and rib, which had healed without residual 
disability, and her damages consisting of hospital and medical expenses of 
$2,200 and lost wages of $800. The jury returned a verdict upon such evidence 
fixing Jones' damages at $35,000. Thereupon, Smith's attorney moved the trial 
court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the grounds that the. 
verdict was excessive. · The trial court entered an order sustaining the motion 
and placing Jones on terms to either accept $25,000 and remit $10,000 of the 
verdict or submit to a new trial on the issue of damages. 
(a) May Jones accept the remittitur and entry of judgment for $25,000 
and thereafter appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court for review of the order of 
remittitur and for entry of judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict? 
(b) May Jones reject the remittitur and submit to a new trial and, 
upon entry of judgment following the new trial, appeal to the Virginia Supreme 
Court for review of the order of remittitur and for entry of judgment in 
accordance with the original jury's verdict? 
* * * * * 
4. John Noonan, a partner in Noall Partnership, a Virginia general 
partnership, has sought your advice in the wake of his partner's unanticipated 
departure from the state. You learn that Mr. Noonan and Mary Allen operated a . 
book store in Blacksburg, Virginia. Mary arranged for the partnership to · 
borrow $20,000 from First Bank for inventory and start up co~ts. Mary signed 
the note on behalf of the partnership. John and Mary agreed that he would 
handle customer relations and purchasing while she would handle the financial 
affairs of the partnership. John was visited last week by the Sheriff of 
Montgomery County who levied on the inventory and cash of the bookstore. 
On checking the records in the Montgomery County General District Court 
Clerk's Office, John learned that personal service of a notice of motion for 
judgment had been made on Mary as a partner of Noall Partnership. John had 
not been served and had no knowledge of the proceedings. Default judgment in 
favor of First Bank in the principal amount of $6,500 plus interest, a 25% 
attorney's fee and costs was entered against the partnership 15 days ago. In 
searching through the company correspondence, John found a letter from First 
Bank to Mary written after suit was filed, but before judgment was taken, in 
which First Bank agreed to continue the case to allow Mary the opportunity to 
obtain counsel. John learned that First Bank did not advise the court of the 
agreement to continue the trial and First Bank obtained judgment on the 
scheduled trial date. 
While continuing his search of Mary's files, John found evidence of 
service of process on Mary thirty days earlier in another action brought 
against the partnership. This action was filed in Montgomery County Circuit 
Court by an individual claiming to have been injured while browsing in the 
store. John learned from the Clerk of the Circuit Court that Mary had not 
filed responsive pleadings and that a hearing was scheduled the following day 
for entry of default judgment and determination of damages. 
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(a) What remedies are available to the partnership in the Montgomery 
County General District Court? 
(b) Assuming that no remedies are available to the partnership in the 
general district court, can the First Bank judgment be appealed by the 
partnership? 
(c) May John's attorney participate in the Circuit Court default 
judgment hearing? 
(d) May John's attorney file responsive pleadings on behalf of the 
partnership in Circuit Court action? 
* * * * * 
5. Andrew was the owner of a large tract of land in Russell County, 
Virginia, known as Castlewood. His friend, Barney, desired to buy a lot and 
build a home in the northwest corner of Castlewood adjacent to Whiteacre, 
which was owned by his parents. The lot was located on the south side of 
Route No. 614, which runs east and west. Andrew then executed and delivered a 
deed to the lot to Barney, which was duly recorded, and in which the land 
conveyed was described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the north end of a stone fence in the southern 
boundary line of Route No. 614, a corner to Whiteacre; thence, 
leaving Whiteacre and with the line of Route No. 614 in an 
easterly direction 100 feet to the historic old tree on the southern 
boundary line of said road, known as "Liberty Tree"; thence, 
due south 100 feet to a concrete marker near the edge of Big Cedar 
Creek; thence, 
in a westerly direction 100 feet to the southern end of the 
aforesaid stone fence; thence, 
in a northerly direction with said stone fence along the boundary 
line of Whiteacre 100 feet to the point of BEGINNING, and containing 
10,000 square feet. 
Andrew and Barney died in a boating accident a few years after the deed was 
recorded. Andrew died intestate, survived by Jared, who was his only heir. 
Barney devised all of his property to his brother, Carl. 
In 1985 Carl, in a burst of enthusiasm, went upon the property and 
proceeded to fence it from the north end of the stone fence along the boundary 
line of the road to the "Liberty Tree" (a distance of 108 feet), then from the 
tree to the concrete marker (even though it was several degrees off of due 
south and a distance of 110 feet), then from the concrete marker to the 
southern end of the stone fence (even though it wa~ a distance of 106 feet, 
and the stone fence was actually 109 feet from the north end to the southern 
end). The lot fenced in by Carl, as shown on the sketch below, contained 
approximately 11,500 square feet. (This sketch is not drawn to scale). 
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Jared, upon discovering Carl's fencing project, told him that it was· 
perfectly obvious that Andrew intended to convey to Barney a 10,000 square 
foot lot, with each line to be 100 feet long, and demanded that Carl remove 
the excess fencing and get off Jared's remaining land. 
Does Carl own all of the lot that he fenced in, or is he limited to the 
10,000 square foot portion as contended by Jared? 
* * * * * 
6. Johnny Smith, a passenger in a vehicle operated by Joe Jones, was 
seriously and permanently injured when their vehicle left the road and struck 
a tree. Smith has filed a civil action against Jones seeking to recover money 
damages in the amount of $100,000 for his injuries. Smith is represented by 
attorney Bob Barton, an experienced and able trial attorney. 
Following a pretrial conference, Barton stipulated with defense counsel 
that the case would be heard by the court without a jury. 
The case was set for trial in the Circuit Court of Smyth County, 
Virginia, on December 31, 1986. On December 30,.1986, at 9:30 A.M., Barton 
received a telephone call from the attorney representing Jones' insurance 
carrier. Barton was offered $20,000 in settlement of the case, but the offer 
was conditioned upon acceptance prior to 1:30 P.M. on that date. If not 
accepted by 1:30 P.M., the offer was to be automatically withdrawn. 
Barton attempted to reach Smith to discuss the settlement offer with 
him but learned that he was not available and was not expected home until 
after 5:00 P.M. Barton talked with Smith's wife, who expressed concern about 
Smith's fitness to appear at trial because he had been on a drinking binge for 
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the last two days, and Barton learned for the first time through the 
conversation that Smith was apparently intoxicated at the time of the 
accident. Barton did not know if defense counsel was aware of this fact 
because it had never been mentioned in the discovery proceedings or in 
settlement negotiations. If Smith prevailed at trial, Barton expected a 
recovery of thirty to forty thousand dollars, and Smith had been advised of 
this evaluation. · 
Because Barton was convinced that settlement was in the best interest 
of his client, he called defense counsel at 1:00 P.M. and accepted the 
settlement offer. The court was then advised that the case had been settled. 
At 6:00 P.M. Barton reached Smith by telephone and advised him that he 
had settled the case for $20,000. Smith was furious and advised Barton that 
his services were no longer required. 
The next day Smith contacts you and asks: 
(a) Is he bound by the settlement made by his lawyer? 
(b) If he is not bound, has his lawyer waived Smith's right to a jury 
trial? 
(c) Was it ethically proper for Smith's lawyer to act as he did? 
* * * * * 
7. In November, 1986, Andy and Ben were deer hunting on Andy's farm in 
Bath County, Virginia. After several hours, during a driving rain, Andy 
spotted a 12 point buck running near the outer boundary of his property and 
fired at the animal, knocking it to the ground. The deer struggled to its 
feet and jumped across a small fence which divided Andy's property and Chuck's 
property, Andy's neighbor. The deer ran about 500 yards and fell again beside 
·a barn on Chuck's property, where it died from the gun shot wound. 
Andy and Ben went onto Chuck's land and retrieved the dead deer. They 
had no permission to hunt there. 
Chuck was unaware of the incident until he ran into Ben at the local 
gun shop, where Ben was talking about what a nice deer Andy had shot. When 
pressed by Chuck, Ben told Chuck that the deer had been taken from Chuck's 
property, and showed him a picture of Andy and the deer beside the barn. 
(a) Chuck comes to you and asks whether he can recover damages from 
Andy for the deer taken from his property. What do you advise? 
(b) Assume that before Chuck discovered that the deer died on his 
property, Andy had taken the animal to a taxidermist and had the head mounted 
at a cost of $500. Can Chuck recover the mounted head? 
* * * * * 
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8. Richard and Suzanne, a young and energetic "do-it-yourself" outdoor 
type couple, became interested in carpentry and decided to order plans for a 
log cabin. After studying the plans and watching the video cassette 
explaining them, they ordered a complete "Rustic Log Cabin Kit", which 
included all the building materials and instructions needed to complete the 
job. They spent the summer of 1984 building the cabin on a lot which they . 
purchased near Ivanhoe, Virginia. By the time they finished the job, they had 
decided to embark on a trip around the world and made plans to sell the cabin 
to finance their trip. 
They agreed to sell the lot and cabin to Tom Daniels for $20,000 cash, 
and after consulting a form book they prepared and executed a deed conveying 
the property to Tom. Tom was delighted with his purchase, recorded his deed, 
and moved in on September 1, 1984, with his bride. All went well with the 
cabin until August 15, 1985, when during a rain storm the rear wall and a part 
of the roof collapsed. 
Tom unfortunately had no homeowner's insurance, and consulted a local 
contractor, who, after inspecting the premises, told him the collapse of the 
cabin wall was caused due to the fact that the wall was built on planks laid 
on top of the soil, rather than on a concrete or masonry foundation, as any 
experienced builder would use. 
After Tom consults your senior partner, you are asked whether: 
(a) Tom has a remedy at law against Richard and Suzanne? 
(b) Tom has an equitable remedy against Richard and Suzanne? 
* * * * * 
9. Major Works Ltd. of Roanoke, Virginia sold two widgets and one 
gadget for $13,750 to Maury Mercutio of Alexandria, Virginia. Mercutio paid 
$2,750 upon placing the order and promised to pay the balance within 45 days 
after receipt of the merchandise. Delivery was made on September 10, 1986. 
One of the widgets and the gadget were damaged prior to delivery. Mercutio 
notified Major Works that he would have the damage repaired by his own shop, 
would deduct the cost of the repairs and would mail Major Works a check for 
the balance. Receiving no objection from Major Works by October 1, 1986, 
Mercutio had the repairs completed and on October 16th mailed the seller "his 
check in the amount of $8,000 with a notation "Payment in full for the 2 
widgets and one gadget received on September 10, 1986." 
Major Works thought Mercutio's deduction of $3,000 was too great and 
wanted to reject Mercutio's tender. At the same time it didn't want to lose 
the money which it had in hand. Accordingly, Major Works had Mercutio's check 
certified at the Roanoke branch of the Alexandria bank upon which the check 
was drawn. It then wrote Mercutio that the partial payment deduction of 
$3,000 was not acceptable, that it would agree to a deduction of $1,200 and 
had accepted the $8,000 check as a payment on account; but Major Works then 
demanded payment of the balance of $1,800. The next day, Major Works 
deposited Mercutio's $8,000 check. Mercutio refused to make any further 
payment and Major Works sued him for $1,800 in the Circuit Court of 
Alexandria. Mercutio filed a plea of accord and satisfaction. Do any of the 
facts set out above afford a basis for the plea to be sustained? 
* * * * * 
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10. Ellen Barker was admitted to Mystic Shores Hospital in Virginia 
Beach, Virginia for surgery. Lacking insurance, she executed a negotiable, 
ninety day promissory note in blank to cover the expenses of her 
hospitalization and authorized the hospital to complete the note in the amount 
of her bill at the time of her discharge. Her husband was not present at the 
time of her admittance. When the hospital listed Mr. Barker as guarantor of 
the bill, Mrs. Barker made no comment. In fact, neither the hospital nor Mrs: 
Barker made any comment at all about Mr. Barker's role in the transaction. 
When Mrs. Barker was discharged, the hospital filled in the note by inserting 
the amount of Mrs. Barker's bill. This was in accordance with Mrs. Barker's 
instructions. 
When Mrs. Barker failed to pay her note, the hospital demanded payment 
from Mr. Barker on the ground that the surgery was a necessity and that he, as 
her husband, was directly liable to the hospital for his wife's necessaries. 
Mr. Barker refused, contending that the necessaries doctrine is inapplicable 
in instances where the wife and a third party agree that the wife shall be 
solely responsible for a particular debt and that by accepting the wife's 
promissory note, the hospital agreed to look solely to his wife. This was his 
first contention. 
Husband also argued (second contention) that under Virginia law husbc(n,d 
is not responsible for any contract, liability or tort of his wi.fe. ·· 
As his third and final contention, the husband argued that the 
necessaries doctrine was unconstitutional in that it imposed a burden on him· 
as husband when it did not impose a similar burden on his wife had the 
situation been reversed. 
Is husband correct as to 
(a) his first, contention, 
(b) his second contention, or 
( c) his third contention? 
